- Points of Controversy
7.3 Of Mental Properties
Controverted Point: That they do not exist.
TheravÄdin: You surely do not also deny that some mental phenomena are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical basis and object in common with it? Why then exclude the āmentalā? Contact, for instance, is co-existent with consciousness; hence it is a āmentalā, i.e., a property or concomitant of mind. So are feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, lust, hate, dullness,⦠indiscretionāall the āmentalsā.
RÄjagirika, Siddhatthika: You allow then that what is co-existent with consciousness is a āmentalā. Do you equally admit that what is co-existent with contact is a ācontactalā, or that what is co-existent with each of those mental phenomena is to be analogously regarded; for instance, that what is co-existent with indiscretion is an āindiscretionalā?
TheravÄdin: Certainly. And if you assert that there are no mental phenomena corresponding to our term āmentalsā,
was it not said by the Exalted One:
āYea! verily this mind and mental states
Are void of soul for one who understands.
Whoso discerns the low and high in both,
The seer, he knows that neither can endureā?
Or again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
āSuppose in this case, Kevaį¹į¹a, that a bhikkhu can make manifest the mind, and the mental property, and the direction and application of thought in other beings, other individuals, saying: Such is your mind. This is your mind. Thus and thus are you consciousā?
Hence there is such a thing as a āmentalā that is, a property, or concomitant, of consciousness or mind
